This paper analyses how the size and socio-economic diversity of their electorate affect parliamentarians' legislative behaviour. We study the Australian senate, which wields considerable legislative influence and is marked by large differences in the size and socioeconomic makeup of the districts that senators represent. We demonstrate that as the size of their district increases, senators ask more questions and introduce more bills and amendments. By contrast, senators become less active as the diversity of their electoral district increases. The paper thus establishes that size and diversity of electorates have significant effects on legislative behaviour.
Introduction
A central task of elected politicians is representing the interests of their voters. They may pursue this task out of a normative conviction or due to purely vote-seeking reasons and may also need to balance it with partly competing necessities such as catering to special interest or local selectorates (Carey 2007) . Representation may also be predominantly organized around cohesive parties leaving little discretion for individual action (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011 ). Yet, in any representative democracy, individual elected politicians will pursue their voters' interest to some degree. In doing so they all face a similar challenge 1 : how can a single representative reflect the preferences of thousands of voters? While it may be feasible to cater to the views of a small number of voters with homogenous interests, more diverse and more numerous electorates complicate parliamentarians' representational activities. Firstly, as the diversity of an electorate increases, it becomes harder, if not impossible, to please all the voters as their diverging interests mean that any proposed policy change will lead to a significant portion of them losing out.
Secondly, a larger electorate may place considerable constraints on a representative's schedule and time available for such activities. With a finite number of hours in the day, an increasing number of voters will be hard to satisfy with personal interactions, such as casework or meeting in-person. Representatives will need to turn to activities that allow for more general credit-claiming with the electorate, such as engaging in highly visible activities in the legislature.
Valuable studies have produced insights into how the number of voters affect specific activities such as government spending (see, for example, Atlas et al. 1995; Chen and Malhotra 2007 ). Yet, the effect of socio-economic diversity and size of an electorate on the larger repertoire of legislative behaviour is still largely unknown. Our paper contributes to filling this gap. We focus on the Australian senate, which offers an interesting variation in electoral district size 2 and socio-economic diversity. Specifically, we explore how the varying make-up and population size of their district influences the way in which Australian senators use parliamentary questions and bill introduction. Our findings highlight that the study of representation needs to take both the diversity of the electorate and the number of constituents into account.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on the effects of district size and diversity on representation, outline our theoretical framework, and present our hypotheses. Second, we discuss the data used to test our hypotheses and the operationalisation thereof. Third, we present our results. We show that the greater the diversity of the electorate, which reduces the possibility of senators appealing to all their voters through policy change, the lower the levels of legislative work senators engage in. At the same time, the greater the number of voters in their district, the more active senators are in the legislature. A final section concludes.
Theory and hypotheses
The representational activities of individual legislators are subject to a great variety of influences. Certain normative convictions and role conceptions (Studlar and McAllister 1996) may lead MPs to engage in activities which bring little to no gains in terms of the famous triad of vote, office and policy-goals (Müller and Strøm 1999) . A sense of duty or simply personally felt reward when connecting to voters could be a driving force behind an MP's interest in constituency service. Yet, MPs' activities are also strongly influenced by institutional constraints. Presidential systems in conjunction with personalistic electoral systems (Carey and Shugart 1995) may give legislators no choice but to compete for personal votes as they would otherwise lose their mandate. In contrast, parliamentary systems and party-centred electoral systems could condense all legislators' activities into a collective partisan enterprise as envisaged by the responsible party model (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011) . This also holds true even if electoral systems provide -in theory -opportunities for personal votes (e.g. preferential systems), but are used by voters in a party-centred way that sets clear incentives to politicians to run on a party ticket (Faas and Schoen 2006) .
The great variety of specific individual convictions and goals, institutional constraints as well as contextual factors may create significantly different behavioural patterns and representational outcomes. There are even constellations conceivable in which MPs and parties are largely unresponsive to the preferences of their voters (Wittman 1973) . However, in each representative democracy individual legislators will need to devote at least some of their activities to the (substantive or symbolic) representation of their voters' interest. The reasons for doing so may be the wish to be a 'good' representative or a selfish desire for re-election or the ambition to contribute to the overall reputation of one's party. Regardless of the exact motivation, each legislator faces the same constraint in pursuing her representational activities: the scarcity of time. Some of the demands on legislators' time are fixed, such as the need to attend floor votes, or they are at least partly under her control, such as interacting with the press. Other demands are variable. The volume of demands made by constituents, for example, is strongly influenced by the voters themselves.
The conscientious legislator thus faces a problem when the number of voters, and so the number of potential problems to be solved and issues to be raised, increase: How to keep constituents happy without spending too much time on them individually? The upper limit in this regard is quickly reached. An Australian senator interviewed for this research noted that '[y]ou can't do everything. I've got one day, I want to do four things, and you just can't'. Studlar and McAllister (1996, 77) report that an Australian senator spends on average more than 16 h per month to address individual grievances. Obviously, the share of voters you can satisfy in that time varies greatly across the differently sized states.
This makes those activities which allow representatives to be responsive to a large number of people at one time more attractive. As another senator noted, if someone wants to have a one-on-one meeting on a relatively small issue, you may not be able to do that, you may instead have to do what I did last weekend and go to a big community meeting … where there [are] a couple of hundred people and you can talk to all of those at once.
At the same time, representatives also recognise that the extent to which voters expect inperson contact is a function of how large the electorate is. A senator from Tasmania, the Australian state with the fewest inhabitants, noted in an interview that 'Tasmanians expect to know and interact with their senators to a larger degree than senators from the larger states', to the extent that 'people come to my office and they expect to be able to talk to me '. 3 A particularly effective reaction to the time pressure facing legislators is to focus more on advocating policy change, as a single piece of legislation may please a great number of voters. While it takes significantly longer to work on a piece of legislation than to solve the problem of an individual voter, the much greater number of constituents affected by legislation makes this a more time-efficient way for representatives to appeal to voters. Different historic and contemporary evidence supports this reasoning. Cox (1987, 51-59) traced the growth of legislative activity in the UK House of Commons in the 19 th century in part to the increased number of voters MPs came to represent, as rotten boroughs were abolished and the share of the population entitled to vote increased. More recently, Atlas et al. (1995) found that as the number of constituents increased, US legislators increased their efforts in terms of changing public policy, and reduced their efforts to obtain pork for their electoral district, as the latter strategy had become less effective in terms of ensuring re-election.
A number of scholars have also investigated the effects of chamber size, with conflicting findings. Some have found that a larger number of legislators leads to a smaller size of government (Pettersson-Lidbom 2012), while Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) find that more legislators lead to more public spending. It has also been found that as district size increases, monitoring costs for citizens increase as well, leading to higher public spending (Thornton and Ulrich 1999) . Similarly, Chen and Malhotra (2007) show that, in US state legislatures, the larger the number of members in the upper chamber, the higher per capita expenditure. At the federal level, Atlas et al. (1995) find that US states attract more spending per capita the more members per capita the state has (indicating over-representation), an effect found in both the House of Representatives and in the Senate.
Comparative work on European legislatures finds that the amount of effort put into casework decreases as electoral district size increases (André and Depauw 2013; André, Bradbury, and Depauw 2014) . A larger number of constituents may lead legislators to focus on legislation, in order to compensate for the inability to engage in sufficient face-to-face contact with voters, and there is some evidence that voters are also less likely to contact their representatives as the number of constituents grows (Squire 1993) . This, however, can be caused by a decrease in the amount of contact by voters solicited by representatives, who realise that they cannot successfully deal with all their constituents' individual problems. The greater costs, both in terms of time and money, of campaigning in more populous constituencies are also reflected in the earlier and faster uptake of the use of the internet in campaigns by legislators with more constituents (Herrnson, Stokes-Brown, and Hindman 2007) .
While the effect of the sheer number of constituents on legislative behaviour has been investigated selectively, the effect of the diversity of voters, that is, how much variation there is in their interests, has remained largely unexplored. Studlar and McAllister (1996, 77) conjecture that the amount of constituency work may vary with the socioeconomic status but do not investigate this empirically. The literature on votes on trade policy in the US Congress offers some insights. It discusses whether the larger constituencies of US senators relative to those of members of the House of Representatives insulates senators from electoral district-specific special interests and induces them to be more supportive of free trade. However, the findings on this question are inconclusive. Mansfield and Busch (1995) argue that larger constituencies lead to less open trade policy, while Rogowski (1987) and Nielson (2003) find that larger constituencies lead to greater openness to trade. Exploring the effect of electoral district size on votes on trade policy in the US Congress, Karol (2007) found no consistent effect of the positions adopted on freetrade votes. However, when directly analysing the effects of electoral district diversity, as opposed to using population size as a proxy, it has been found that the more diverse a US state is, the better party and interest group scores predict voting in the US Senate on free trade, and the smaller the effects of other electoral district characteristics are. The reverse relationship exists for homogeneous states (Bailey and Brady 1998) . Finally, in comparative work, Rogowski and Kayser (2002) argue that single member districts lead to lower consumer prices, as these make electoral results (and so political parties) more sensitive to smaller changes in the vote, limiting the importance of organised interests in elections.
It is not surprising that the findings of previous research are inconclusive as there are many country-specific influences on legislative behaviour. With regard to the Australian senate, we expect that differences in both the number of voters and the diversity of the electorate alter the cost and benefits of engaging in legislative activities. As the population increases, the marginal benefit of engaging with legislation goes up, as more voters can be affected. At the same time, the marginal benefit from person-to-person meetings decreases, as the number of such meetings required to win a district becomes too large to be realistic to pursue.
The rational response of a senator to an increasing electorate, given the hard time-constraint of a limited number of hours in the day, would be to focus more on activities which allow for more general credit-claiming. We are somewhat agnostic about the question of whether increased credit-claiming activities correspondingly reduce the time spent on (time-consuming) in-person meetings. Though we think that this is a reasonable expectation, there may also other time budgets and resources from which senators draw to increase legislative work. This gives us:
Hypothesis 1: The more voters within an electoral district, the more active a senator becomes in the legislature.
On the other hand, when the diversity of interests a legislator represents increases, it becomes harder to appeal to a sufficient number of them through legislative work, in part because the greater diversity of preferences increases the risk of upsetting at least part of the electorate. As the diversity of the electorate increases, the marginal benefit of pursuing policy change decreases, and the marginal cost increases, as any proposed policy change will both benefit a smaller share of the voters and risk alienating a greater share of them.
4 Essentially, if the voters' interests are concentrated, a legislator can please (almost) everyone; if the district is diverse, it is impossible to please everyone. This gives us:
Hypothesis 2: The more diverse an electoral district is, the less active a senator becomes in the legislature.
It is important to note that changes in electoral district size and diversity are two separate phenomena. While it is possible for both to move in the same direction to the same extent, there is no strong reason to expect that a larger number of people would be more diverse than a smaller number, and vice versa. Whether this is the case is an empirical question, and, as we show below, the correlation between diversity and district size in our data is quite weak.
Data and operationalisation
To operationalise these hypotheses, we observe three types of legislative activity: introducing bills, introducing amendments, and asking questions. 5 We study the effect of diversity and district size on behaviour with specific reference to the Australian senate. This chamber was chosen for four key reasons. Firstly, the use of an equal number of senators for each state means that the senate is subject to significant malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder 2001 ), so we find wide variation in the size of senators' electorates; senators from New South Wales (the most populous state) have around 14 times as many constituents as those from Tasmania (the least populous).
6 Secondly, the Australian senate is very powerful, being equal to the House of Representatives in all non-financial legislation (Constitution of Australia 2012 sec 53; Uhr 1999).
7 As such, the actions of senators have substantial effects on public policy. Third, Australian senators have an unrestricted right to initiate bills and amendments (Standing Orders of the Australian Senate 2014 art. 90(1) and art. 111(1)), as well as to ask written questions (art. 74 (1)). As such, the behaviour of senators will reflect their desire to act, as access to the agenda is not concentrated in either the party leadership or the government. Fourth, the Australian senate keeps thorough records of bills, amendments, and questions, meaning that we are able to analyse the population of behaviour over an extended period of time, rather than being restricted to a sample. Some key compositional characteristics of the Senate are shown in Table 1 . 8 One legitimate objection is that Australian senators should not and are not engaged in individualised re-election seeking strategies. Australian parties are considered particularly strong and party unity is very high (Studlar and McAllister 1996, 73) . Furthermore, while the Single-Transferable Vote system used for Senate elections has -in theory -a high potential for re-election focussed on the individual candidate (Mitchell 2000) , the way voters use it turns it into something approaching a closed-list electoral system (Sawer 2005) . More specifically, so-called 'above-the-line' voting is very prevalent (averaging around 95 per cent, with variation in the frequency in the different states), meaning that voters cast their vote for the entire party list instead of for individual candidates. Hence, legislative activity can hardly be interpreted as a rational instrument of individual vote-seeking as senators first and foremost owe their mandate to their party. We do, however, think that it is exactly the party and the partisan selectorates which have an interest that senators, as representatives of their party, invest in the efficient representation of constituency interest.
A number of Senators interviewed for this project, from both the Labor and Liberal parties, indicated that senators were expected to function as a point of contact and constituency service, in particular for voters who lived in House of Representatives seat not held by their own party. One noted that 'I have seven seats where I'm supposed to be the face of Labor', and another that 'where there's a Labor Party lower house member, I'll have responsibility as a Liberal senator to provide an elected member point of contact for the constituency.' 9 Accordingly, senators satisfying these requirements may be rewarded with the best spots on the party list and other electorally valuable resources. Hence, rather than an individual party-independent activity, pleasing constituents by specific legislative activities may be instrumental to pleasing one's party.
One instrument of pleasing voters is the submission of bills and amendments (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014; Crisp et al. 2004; Mayhew 1974) , which allows legislators to address issues of interest to their constituents. Although, due to the near-monopoly control of governments over the legislative process in parliamentary regimes, bills initiated by individual legislators are highly unlikely to become law (Döring 1995; Mattson 1995) , the act of initiating bills and submitting amendments may still pay off as a signal to voters, Note: Population based on 2011 census. ACT and NT included for completeness, but excluded from the analysis (see footnote 10).
taking positions that are popular with them and signalling being hard at work (Bowler 2010; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Crisp et al. 2013; Däubler, Bräuninger, and Brunner 2016; Loewen et al. 2014) .
Parliamentary questions serve a large number of purposes (Russo and Wiberg 2010 list 14 different uses) including scrutiny of the executive (Proksch and Slapin 2011) . The tendency of the media to pay more attention to parliamentary questions than to other parliamentary activities and their providing a recorded instance of a legislator working hard mean that parliamentary questions are a key tool in terms of both voter representation and the pursuit of re-election (Martin 2011) . Similar to the introduction of bills and amendments, questions may not lead to changes in policy, but they can be used as a clear signal to voters regarding a legislator's activities and priorities. Although an individual question may have little effect, recent work has shown their importance for legislators pursuing re-election, as they are able to claim credit for the volume of their work rather than simply their efficacy as representatives (Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood 2012) .
Submitting bills, amendments and questions may not be the most effective strategy to please voters in a highly visible manner. For most voters these legislative activities will go largely unnoticed. Ideally, our hypotheses should also be tested taking a more holistic perspective on other legislative and non-legislative behaviour and their instrumental value for credit-claiming. Friendly media coverage may be the most effective way to win votes and will promote an individual senator more than her submitting ten bills (Hopman et al. 2010) . Hence, senators may try to increase their media presence by trying to play along the jokes in a popular tonight show, by calling into radio shows or by sending sensational tweets (Nulty et al. 2016 ). Furthermore, they might think of many of their legislative activities as instrumental in generating 'good press'. Unfortunately, the causal relationship between specific legislative activities and media coverage is still not well understood and the intentional usage of the media by politicians is hard to quantify.
We are, however, convinced that our empirical focus is still promising for different reasons. First, legislative data is thoroughly and systematically recorded, and allows usin contrast to social media activity -to study a longer time period. Second, bills, questions and amendments are likely instrumental to achieving at least some media coverage especially, when they are meant to address local needs.
As noted above, for all three types of activities, members of the Australian senate are procedurally unrestricted in the extent to which they engage in them. We collected data on the introduction of bills and amendments in the Australian senate for the period 1985 to 2013, as well as data on written questions ('questions on notice') in the Senate from 2004 to 2013. We use 1985 as the cut-off year for data on the introduction of bills and amendments due the increase in the number of senators from 64 to 76, that is, an increase from ten to twelve senators per state, taking effect that year (Bach 2003 ch. 3) .
Data on the introduction of bills and the tabling of amendments were obtained by downloading and scraping the daily Hansards of the Australian senate from the senate website (Commonwealth of Australia n.d.). As senator terms in Australia are staggered, with half of senators from each state elected every three years, we calculate the total number of bills (respectively amendments) she had introduced in each half-term -a full term here defined as the six-year period an Australian senator is elected for.
10 A half-term is then the period between two elections to the senate (i.e. a senator elected and serving one full six-year term will be in our data for two half-terms).
11 By looking at an entire half-term at a time, any effect of variations in legislative activity levels over the course of a term is avoided.
As regards questions asked, we collected these data from the Senate website. 12 From these, we first calculated the total number of questions asked per senator per half-term to allow us to analyse the total volume of questions. Second, the greater number of questions asked allows us to meaningfully explore the diversity of topics raised in questions to the government. As with levels of activity, we expect that the more populous a senator's district is, the more diverse a range of questions she will ask, as this is an effective way of signalling a large number of voters, with a broad focus indicating an active representative. The more diverse a district is, the smaller a range of questions we expect a senator to ask. The reason for this mirrors that for activity levels. The broader the range of interests that exist in a district, the greater the risk of offending at least some of the views held by some meaningful share of voters by raising topics with the government. Therefore, we calculated the diversity of topics on which questions were asked, as discussed in more detail below. Table 2 gives a summary of the dependent variables calculated.
For the three types of data dealing with the volume of activity engaged in, the dependent variables are count data, as they have a lower bound of zero and increase in discrete steps of one. In all three cases, the variance of the dependent was significantly larger than the mean, and we fitted negative binomial models. As we observe the same cross-section (senators) multiple times, the data should be analysed as panel data. The presence of unobserved unit-specific characteristics introduces the possibility of serial correlation of the error terms across time. Hausman tests indicate that fixed effects are necessary to address this issue for all three dependent variables.
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To illustrate the development of the introduction of bills and amendments, as well as the asking of written questions over time, we plotted these by the term they were introduced in, as shown in Figures A1-A3 in the appendix. While a general over-time trend appears to exist in terms of the introduction of bills and amendments, no such trend exists for questions. Conducting Hadri-Lagrange tests for the presence of a unit root confirms these visual indications of the data not being stationary, the null hypothesis of no unit root only being rejected for the number of questions asked. To correct for the presence of unit root, we therefore include term dummies in the models analysing the volume of bills and amendments introduced. (Bills and amendments: 1985-2013; Questions: 2004 Questions: -2013 . ACT and NT included for completeness, but excluded from the analysis (see footnote 10).
To test the effect of size on legislative activity levels (hypothesis 1), we use data on the population of Australia, obtained from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) . Behavioural data was matched to the census year nearest the election year in which a term ended.
To test the effect of diversity of interests a senator represents (hypothesis 2), we employed three different measures. For the first two, we collected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) the Index of Education and Occupation, which measures levels of education and of skilled occupation, and the Index of Economic Resources, which measures levels of income and wealth.
14 For both of these, to measure the diversity of economic interests in a state, we calculated for each census year the standard deviation of the distribution of these indices, at the state level.
15 Behavioural data were then matched to the nearest census year (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011) . It should be noted that the correlation between the standard deviation of the Index of Education and Occupation and the Index of Economic Resources is only .291, indicating that these are capturing different types of diversity. Further, the correlation between the standard deviation of the Index of Education and Occupation and the Index of Economic Resources and the number of inhabitants in a state is .139 and .256, indicating that the diversity of a state is not simply a function of population. As noted previously, a bigger population does not necessarily imply more diversity, or vice versa.
As the third measure of interest diversity, we collected from the ABS yearly data on the Remoteness Index and the distribution of population by remoteness area, for the years 2004-2013. As the Remoteness Index only exists for the years since 2001, in order to avoid dropping observations, we only use this variable when analysing the asking of questions. The Australian Remoteness Structure classifies each statistical area according to its access to government services, with a lower score indicating better access. These areas are then classified into one of six categories. 16 The ABS provides data on the distribution of the population by the remoteness category they fall into. We created a population-weighted index of remoteness on a state basis by multiplying the population with the remoteness category value, as used by the ABS. 17 This measure thus captures the diversity of interests caused by the density of population in a state.
We also include six control variables in the models. Firstly, we control for government status of a senator's party; second, we control for whether the control of the two chambers of the Australian parliament was split between the government and the opposition. For both these variables, we calculated the share of a senator's half-term where this was the case.
18 Thirdly, as the use of staggered terms in the Australian senate means that the time horizons, and so potentially re-election oriented-behaviour, of senators within the chamber differ (Willumsen and Goetz 2015) , we control for whether a senator was facing the electorate in the next election for the senate (yes = 1). Fourthly, to capture the effect of partisan balance on legislative activity (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006), we control for the share of a state's senate delegation which belongs to the party of the senator. 19 Interviews in the Australian senate indicate that there is an expectation that senators are available for voters to contact, in particular those voters who live in a House of Representatives district not controlled by the senator's party. The greater the share of the state's delegation is controlled by a senator's party, ceteris paribus, the fewer constituents will contact the individual senator. 20 Fifth, we control for the number of months served as a senator (averaged over each term), as legislators with longer service have greater access to name-recognition and similar resources, allowing them to be more confident of re-election (Ashworth 2005) . Finally, we control for the share of a half-term in which a senator served as a government minister.
Results
The results of the models are presented in the first four columns of Table 3 . To ease interpretation, the results are shown in incidence rate ratios. Incidence rate ratios describe the multiplicative change in the expected count when the explanatory variable increases by one unit, while all the other explanatory variables remain unchanged. As such, values over 1 indicate that the variable has a positive effect on the expected number of bills/amendments/questions introduced, and values below 1 indicate that a variable has a negative expected effect. For example, an incidence rate ratio of 1.1 for an independent variable means that an increase of one in that variable leads to a 10% increase in the expected number of activities, while an incidence rate ratio of .8 means that an increase of one in that variable leads to a 20% decrease in the expected number of activities. To visualise the effects of the variables of interests, we plotted the effect sizes of these in Figure 1 . 21 Looking at Figure 1 , which shows the effect sizes and confidence intervals of the models analysing the number of questions asked and the number of bills and amendments introduced, we find partial support for hypothesis 2 (diversity), but no statistically significant support for hypothesis 1 (number of constituents). In terms of electoral district diversity, we find that senators ask significantly fewer questions when the educational and occupational diversity of the voters in their district increases. As can be seen from Table 3 , in the full model (including the measure of remoteness), there is a statistically significant negative effect of the diversity of senators' electoral district on the number of questions they ask, as measured by the standard deviation of the education and occupation index. As this increases from its mean to its 90th percentile, the predicted number of questions asked decreases from 1.24 per half-term to .31. 22 In other words, a senator from the most diverse state in the dataset would be expected to ask a quarter as many questions as one from a state with a mean level of diversity.
While the number of bills shows a small increase, and the number of amendments introduced a small decrease, as the educational and occupation diversity of a district increases, these effects are not significant. Also worth noting is that, while not statistically significant, the effect of an increase in the diversity of economic resources in an electoral district leads to a (non-significant) decrease in the number of bills introduced and number of questions asked, whereas it leads to a (again, non-significant) decrease in the number of amendments introduced. Finally, the effect of the number of inhabitants in a senator's district is positive in two of the four models, and negative in two. However, in none of these cases is the effect found statistically significant.
To further explore the effects of district size and diversity on representation, we look at the spread of questions asked, that is, the range of topics raised in senators' questions. The logic is that, if a senator wants to represent a broader range of issues on behalf of their constituents, asking questions across a wide range of topics is a highly efficient way of doing so. In order to analyse the spread of policy areas over which a senators asked questions, we calculated the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hirschman 1964; Rhoades 1993) , thus capturing the concentration of questions across different ministries.
23 A histogram of the distribution of the HHI is shown in Figure A4 in the appendix. As the HHI ranges between 0 and 1, 24 we analyse it using a fractional regression model. To deal with over-time correlation of individual-specific error terms, we use robust standard errors. 25 The results are shown in the last column of Table 3 . As it is easier to interpret the results of a fractional regression model that uses logit, since it allows odds ratios to be calculated, Table 3 shows only the results of the fractional regression using logit, expressed in odds ratios.
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The effect sizes for both the logit and probit models are shown in Figure 2 . As the confidence intervals of the remoteness variable are quite large, these are not shown in Figure 2 , in order to allow for the illustration of the results from the other measures of diversity. Figure A7 in the appendix shows the same plot with the effect sizes of the remoteness variable included. As can be seen, while a more remote population 27 leads to a wider range of questions asked, this effect is not significant.
Looking at Figure 2 , we find that, although the effect is not significant in any of the models for either hypothesis 1 (number of constituents), or hypothesis 2 (electoral district diversity), the effects are consistently in the expected, negative, direction. Figure 2 suggests that, as the diversity of an electoral district increases, senators ask a narrower range of questions of ministers, most likely driven by the risk of signalling a position opposed by a least some of their constituents, and so choose to focus their efforts elsewhere. At the same time, as the number of constituents they have to represent increases, there is a statistically significant increase in the range of questions asked to ministers, reflecting the need for more efficient ways to appeal to the electorate.
28 This is the rational response of a senator seeking to most efficiently use her time, as questions regarding policy can be pointed to as proof of effort in subsequent electoral campaigns. We thus find support here for hypothesis 1.
In terms of the control variables, we find that, although the effect is not statistically significant, senators appear to be less active in terms of the number of bills and amendments introduced, as well as the range of questions asked, in the second half of their term, that is, when they are 'up next', than in the first half other their term. However, they ask more questions in the second half of their term (however only in the models controlling for remoteness). Government party senators ask significantly fewer questions, and propose significantly fewer bills and amendments than other senators, most likely due to their superior access to both information and policy change resulting from partisan links with the government. The spread of their questions is, however, significantly larger than for opposition MPs. Serving in a split parliament leads senators to propose fewer bills and amendments, and to ask fewer questions, although none of these effects are significant. Senators serving in a split parliament also ask questions of a broader range of ministers. The greater the share of a district's senatorial delegation is held by a senator's party, the less active senators are in terms of the volume of legislative work they engage in, while asking a greater range of questions. Finally, ministers are generally less active in parliament, with the exception of the introduction of amendments, which they are significantly much more likely to introduce than non-ministers.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the effects of electoral district size and diversity on legislative activity levels. Applying our framework to the Australian senate, we find that the more diverse a district is, the less active senators are, in particular in terms of asking questions of the government. On the other hand, the population of a district does not have a consistent effect on the activity levels of senators.
Further, we find a significantly larger range of questions asked the greater the population of a state is, indicating attempts to represent a range of constituent interests. While not statistically significant, we also found that senators from more diverse states consistently ask a narrower range of questions.
In summary, we find some statistically significant support for our hypotheses, although this is not the case in all models. The relatively small size of the Australian senate means that our number of observations is quite limited, which has implications for the statistical power of our tests. However, with four minor exceptions, the direction of the effects is as our hypotheses predict: the greater the population in a senator's district, the more active they are, but the more diverse the district, the less active they become. 29 Further, the evidence for the activity least costly in terms of time and effort, and so best suited for signalling voters, that is, the asking of questions, is also the clearest, with statistically significant support for the expectation that more populous districts lead to a broader range of questions asked.
One potential explanation for the limited number of significant findings is the use of above-the-line voting in Australian senate elections. As noted earlier, this has the effect of turning STV into something resembling closed-list PR (Sawer 2005) , with much more limited incentives to cultivate a personal vote in the electorate. Though parties may encourage their senators to engage in some activities catering to constituencies this is likely to remain below the levels induced by personalistic electoral systems that make personal votes a necessary condition for a political career.
The fact that we still find some significant effects suggests that senators nonetheless are responsive to their voters' interests, and take into consideration the factors outlined in our theoretical framework when deciding where to focus their efforts. A second potential explanation relates to the variation in the incentives of Australian senators to appeal to their constituents over the course of their term (Willumsen, Stecker, and Goetz 2018) , which may somewhat overshadow the effects of population and diversity.
Our focus in this paper has been on using legislative activity to more effectively communicate with a larger and more diverse district. However, the theoretical framework can also be applied to other activities. Thus, future research should explore whether more diverse constituencies lead to differences in behaviour when it comes to communicating with constituents, such as the purchasing of media ads, social media presence, and efforts to feature more often and prominently on local television and in local newspapers.
The results, although based on a single chamber, indicate that electoral and also time pressures have an important influence on how representatives behave in the legislature. When their electorate is more diverse, there is a smaller incentive to put forward any of their constituents' interests in the legislative process, even in a proportional electoral system, as it may risk offending other voters or making them feel neglected. On the other hand, once a district becomes more populous, the inability to interact with a sufficient number of voters on an individual basis encourages representatives to shift attention to work in parliament. As such, our findings indicate that when trying to explain legislators' activities, it is necessary to take into account both the size and diversity of the electorates they represent.
We have of course only taken a first step to assess the influence of the diversity and population size of constituencies on the activities of senators. Several future avenues seem promising. It would be fruitful to study the Australian state parliaments that offer a valuable variance in the size and diversity of electoral districts -the core variables we are interested in. Scaling down to subnational units also comes with other methodological advantages such as a high control of erroneous factors (Snyder 2001) . Another improvement could be to study a broader set of behavioural indicators. On the one hand some activities might be more salient in the sense of our theory. If (social) media activity, for example, is a more effective strategy to please constituents, we should accordingly see stronger effects than of the indicators we analysed. At the same time, digging deeper into legislative activities, such as the content of parliamentary questions, bills and amendments may also be a promising avenue. Rather than only in the sheer frequency of activities legislators might react to their constituencies make-up by modifying the content of their motions (Grimmer 2013) .
Notes
1. In fact, as it improves the overall party reputation, parties will often encourage their MPs to cater to their constituencies to the extent that collective party goals are not compromised (Shugart 2005 ). 2. We use '(electoral) district size' throughout to refer to the size of the population in a district (as opposed to the geographical extent of it). 3. The interviews with Australian senators were conducted by one of the authors at the Australian parliament in Canberra in October 2015. 4. This is true even in the case of most particularistic spending: The more diverse the interests of a constituency, the less likely any individual voter is to benefit from such spending, whereas the cost to the voters (in the form of taxes) remains constant. Compared to the US, however, fiscal particularism is less common in Australia. 5. While asking questions is not necessarily directly related to the production of legislation, for simplicity, refer to all three activities as 'legislative behaviour'.
6. It should be noted that while the staff allotted to Australian senators varies by the size of the state they represent, with four staffers assigned to senators from Tasmania, five to those from Victoria, and six for the remaining four states, the extra staff is intended for a second (third) constituency office (those with four staff have one such office), not for a research assistance in the Parliament, where they could help with the draft of bills and amendments, or with the preparation of questions to be asked (Australian Department of Finance 2017). 7. While the senate cannot formally amend budget or taxation bills (Constitution of Australia 2012 sec 53), it can suggest such amendments, and its consent is necessary to pass either type of bill (Bach 2003) . 8. Please see Figures A9-A12 in the appendix for the descriptive relationship between the dependent variables and the key independent variables of interest. 9. A third senator stated that 'They [the party] will say "[Senator's name], we don't have a Liberal Party member in this seat and this seat, and we would like you to be there and represent the party base, deal with the media". So you've always got those patron seats to look after.' 10. The Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory each elect two senators for three-year terms. As the district magnitude for these senators is very different to those elected in the Austrian states (2 vs. 12), we exclude them from the analysis, to avoid any confounding effects of differences in district magnitude. 11. The 3-year term after the 1984 federal election was cut short by the 1987 double dissolution of the Australian parliament. However, as the 1987 election took place more than 30 months into a 36-month term, the effect of the shorter term would have been quite limited. Further, as we include term dummies for the models which cover the 1984-87 term, any decrease in activity levels caused by the double dissolution will be captured by these. 12. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Statistics/Senate_StatsNet/General/questions. 13. For questions, the Hausman test is significant at the .0521 level. Given the borderline significance, and to maximise comparability with the other dependent variable, we also include fixed effects in the models analysing questions. 14. http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/seifa. 15. An alternative approach would be to use a direct measure of economic diversity. A number of such measures of economic diversity exist (Dissart 2003; Maignan et al. 2003; Siegel, Johnson, and Alwang 1995; Wagner and Deller 1998) , there is no agreement over which is superior, and the data necessary to calculate these are not readily available. 16. Major city; inner regional; outer regional; remote; very remote; migratory. 17. Major city = 0; inner regional = 1; outer regional = 2; remote = 3; very remote = 4; migratory = 5. 18. For example, if a senator's party was in power for half of a given half-term, she would be coded as 0.5. 19. These data were coded based on the Australian Politics and Elections Database (University of Western Australia 2016). 20. We also calculated the share of each senator's home state's House of Representatives delegation which belonged to the senator's party. However, these two variables correlate at above .70, and so, to avoid problems arising due to multicollinearity, we only include the variable measuring the share of the state senate delegation belonging to the senator's party. 21. This was done using the 'coefplot' package in Stata 14 (Jann 2014) . 22. Note that the summary statistics in Table 2 indicate an average number of questions per senator of nearly 39, this is driven primarily by a number of outliers. Over half of the observations (senator in a half-term) are zero, with the figures for the states ranging from 45% (Western Australia) to 63% (NSW). Around 74% of observations fall in the zero-to-ten range. The use of unit fixed effects in the analysis captures the effect of these outliers, which explains the values presented here. 23. In economics, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated by summing the square of the market share of each firm in a product and geographical market; here, we calculated it using the share of questions asked of each minister by each senator.
24. The HHI never can be 'true' zero, as a non-infinite number of firms (questions) will still have some concentration. The HHI can, however, be equal to one, in the situation where a market is perfectly concentrated in a single firm (all of a senator's questions are asked of a single minister). 25. As a robustness test, in addition to the fractional regression model, we also ran the models as a time-series regression model (no time-series fractional regression model is implemented in Stata). A Hadri-Lagrange test for unit root does not reject the null hypothesis of no unit root in these data, so we ran these models without term dummies. A Hausman test indicates that the models should be run with random effects. As can be seen from Table A1 and Figure A8 in the appendix, the results are broadly identical to those presented here. 26. The correlation between the predicted values for the models using logit and probit is .9987;
the predicted values are shown plotted against each other, with a 45-degree line (indicating perfect correlation) as a reference point, in Figure A6 in the appendix. 27. Recall that remoteness is operationalised as the ease (or lack thereof) of acess to government services. 28. These findings remain significant if the logged population is used instead. 29. As our data contain the population of questions asked by Australian senators for a decade, as well as of bills and amendments introduced (for three decades), it can be argued that the focus should not be on whether an effect is significant at the 5 per cent level or not, as we are not extrapolating from a sample.
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